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Pensions, Unions and Implicit Contracts
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the relation of pension coverage and key plan
characteristics to measures of union membership and strength, and to
related interactions. The large and significant relationships which are
found cannot be explained by, and are often inconsistent with, predictions
obtained by extending the major explanations for the existence of pensions
to allow for union monopoly effects. The findings support some (but not
other) explanations in which the impetus for pensions arises more directly
from the behavior of unions, and suggest that behavioral and related policy
analyses of pensions should be conducted separately for the union and
nonunion sectors.
Alan Gustmari Thomas L. Steinmejer
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Dartmouth College Texas Tech University
Hanover, NH 03755 Lubbock, Texas 79409?.Introduction.
Over bali of older workers are currently eligible for pensions when
they retire. Any detailed namination of the almost bewildering array of
provisions in actual pension plans quickly reveals that these plans are fir
from monolithic. Siaple tabulations, and regression analyses using data
from firm reports on pensions1 show a strong relation of union status to
pension coverage and to plan characteristics (Kotlikoff and Smith, 1983;
Freeman, 1985; and Ippolito, 1985).In this paper, the relation between
unions and plan characteristics forms the basis for tests of the available
theories of pensions, both those in which unions play a special role and
those in which they do not. Our findings suggest that despite the
potentially important influence of plan characteristics on retirement,
mobility and work effort, economists have yet to isolate a behavioral model
of pension plan determination which can fully account for the observed
variation in plan characteristics.
In the absence of a behavioral explanation for pensions which is
consistent with the empirical evidence, we are in a poor position to
evaluate the effects of major legislative initiatives regulating pensions
and retirement behavior. Hany of the behavioral models would lead us to
expect that firms and unions will adjust pension coverage and plan
characteristics in response to regulations and legislation, such as those
affecting vesting, mandatory retirement, treatment of benefits for
separated but vested employees, loading of benefits, actuarial returns for
early retirement, and rules regulating funding, plan termination and
pension insurance. Yet the likely adjustments suggested by alternative
behavioral models may be quite different.
This paper has two broad goals. One is to assess further the union—
nonunion differences in pensions, analyzing them in a multivarlate setting
Iwhere a full set of demoqraphic and labor market information is available,
while considering more systematically the form that these union influences
maytake. Toward this end, we are using aunique data set, thei83 Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF).It is based on a national random sample of
individuals, but for thoseinthe survey who indicated they were covered by
pension plans4 detailed information about their pensions was obtained from
their employers In addition along with a systematic analysis of
interaction effectswe areincluding amongtheunion variables a measure
ofthe proportionofthe workers in the industrywho are orqanied. This
measure of union strengths which frequently is included in union wage
analyses, typically is ignored in pension equations.(See, however,
Ippolito, 1985.)
A second goal of the paper is to use the estimated relations between
measures of union influence and plan characteristics to narrow the set of
explanations for pensions. A surprisingly large number of theoretical
explanations may account for the disproportionately high coverage by
pensions in the union sector. Some of these explanations are obtained by
extending models explaining why pensions exist in the first place to allow
for union monopoly effects, while others specifically focus on union goals
and/or firm reactions to unions By comparing predictions from these
models as to union—nonunion differences in plan coverage and
characteristics with actual outcomes, it is possible to cast doubt on a
surprising number of the explanations for pensions and for the union—
pension relation, or at least on their use a.s the sole explanation for
theseoutcomes
Theoroarizaticn of the paper 15 as follows. The next sectaon
discusses the predict ions of several hypotheses for the effect of unions onpension plancharacteristics. SectionIII discusses the empirical
specification and the data set employed inthestudy. The followinq
section preserts the empirical results and considers their implications for
the various hypotheses considered irl Section 11.A final section contains
a brief discussion of conclusions andimplications.
II.Predictions From Implicit Contract Models And Models Of Union
BehaviorFor Union—Nonunion Pension Differentials.
This section discusses the predictions of each of eiqht theories for
the impact of unions on five specific pension characteristics. Table 1
summarizes these predictions, with one row for each theory and one column
for each characteristic. It is apparent from cells in thetablethat some
theories qenerate stronqer predictions for the union—pension relations than
do others. Thus our analysis will more severely tests some theories than
others.
The first characteristics coverage, indicates simply whether unions
would result in more or fewer individuals being covered by a pension at
all. Plan type refers to whether unions would result in an increase in the
proportion of pensions which are defined benefit (DB) or defined
contribution (DC). The third column indicates whether plans covering union
workers would be more likely to have age and service requirements to
collect normal retirement benefits or requirements which depend only on
age. Formula refers to whether union plans are favored to have benefits
explicitly depending on a formula in which pay appears (FAP), or whether
benefits are independent of pay (i.e. pattern plans). The last column
indicates whether the plans of union workers are more or lees likely to be
integrated with Social Security, wherein an amount related to potential
Social Security benefits is subtracted from the basic pension benefit or a
0_*smaller factor is usedtocompute the pension benefit for income below the
Social Security tax base or a related figure, and a larger factor is used
for earnings above the specified income.
According to the human capital explanation for pensions, the firm and
the worker are sharinQ the returns to specific human capital. Defined
benefit pensions are a convenient mechanism for tilting the age—
compensation profile so as to provide the worker with appropriate
incentives not to switch employers and thereby sacrifice the specific human
capital. With pensions, the worker is in effect compensated below his
potential productivity at alternative employers in the early years of the
implicit contract and above that productivity in the later years. The
compensation downturn induced by the pension at the age of normal
retirement is necessary to terminate the contract when the debt is repaid.
Secause unions increase the overall level of compensation, the resulting
wage differential already provides a substantial incentivefor the
individual not to quitandthus reduces the need for defined benefit
pensions to reduce turnover (Freeman, 1980a and 1985). Because defined
benefit plans load a much greater proportion of benefits towards later
years of employment than do defined contribution plans, they present arisk
to the worker from turnover that appears to exceed the investment risk from
defined contribution plans. Thus the "prediction' from the human capital
model is that defined benefit plans should be less common where there are
unions, as indicated in row 1 in the table.
In the shirkinq hypothesis (Lazear, 1979, 1983), defined benefit plans
are again usedtotilt the eqe—compersation profile and terminate the
implicitcontract at anappropriate age. The purpose of the contract is to
diiecourageshirkingby threatening dismissal ofanyworker caught shirking,
which would in turn deny the worker the opportunity ofworkinqin the later
4years and earnircompansaton that wouldbehigher than productivity.
In this scerrio inion have oaettinq effects. The union wane premium
by itself provides some penalty to workers who are terminated for shirkinq.
but unions also sake itmore difficulttodismiss workersforany reason,
including shirking. In order to maintain the incentives to avoid shirking,
unionized firms are less inclined to have defined benefit plans if the
former effect dominates and more inclined if the latter effect dominates.
The net effect is thus unclear, as reflected in the blank second row in the
table.
An adverse selection model developed by Parsons (1983) is based on a
deterioration in the health and productivity of some workers. Large firms
are assumed unable to distinguish fully which workers are affected, and
hence they must pay the same compensation to all workers they perceive as
equal. The more productive workers then find work in other firms or in
self—employment where they can better be compensated according to their
true productivity, resulting in a process of adverse selection that may at
some age result in the collapse of the demand for older workers by larger
firms. Unions exacerbate the problem by making it more difficult for firms
either to adjust compensation or to fire those in ill health, even if they
can observe productivity. Defined benefit plans, with their attendant
incentives to retire at the normal retirement age, are one strategy for
avoiding the adverse selection problem by inducing all older workers to
leave the firm at some given age. Accordingly, unionized firms should be
more likely to have defined benefit plans so as to alleviate the problems
of adverse selection. Moreover, since the problem is age related, the
requirements for normal retirement in these plans should be related
strictly to age rather than to a combination of age and service.The pension u.nderfundinq theory, developed by Ippolito (1985), is
based on the firm'sreactionto the presence of a union. Firms are assumed
to employ specific physical capital with a value outside the firm that is
low.In this setting, it may be totheadvantaqe of a majority of union
workers to stage a 'holdup and appropriate through excessively high wages
a portor! of the quasi—rents in fact due to the specific physical capital.
To induce investment in the firm, an implicit contract is arranged whereby
workers are paid, in part, in the form of underfunded pensions with a value
that diminishes if the workers do stage a holdup and force the firm out of
business. Defined benefit plans are required if the plans are to be
significantly underfunded. Moreover with current insurance arrangements,
the back loading cf benefits under defined benefit plans creates a cost to
the worker from plan termination. The theory does not appear to yield
determinate results as to the expected effects of a union presence on the
other pension plan characteristics considered in the table.
The next two rows in the table contain the two major elements of the
"union voice" explanation for pensions. The first of these is the median
voter model of the union, in which unions press for provisions which favor
the median union worker rather than the marginal worker, where the former
is more likely to be an older, high seniority worker and the latter a young
worker. (Freeman, 198Ob Freeman and Medoff, 1984).In the context of
pensions, the important fact is that the median worker has substantially
longer tenure, and hence is more likely to be with the firm until
retirement, than the marginal worker. Relative to themarginalworker, the
pension of the median worker is enhanced by a defined benefit plan with a
final average payformula ard Social Securityoffsets. These provisions
allow the median worker, in effect. to capture some of the pension
contributions made by individuals +roe the saErie cohort who do not stayuntil retirement, especially if the real wage profile is rising (Freeman,
198, p. 105).1Finally,a iOflQtenuremedian worker prefers age and
service requirements for normal retirement, providing the worker with the
option of retiring with full benefits at an earlier age than a late
entering older worker. Requiring the (relatively) short tenure older
worker to wait later until collecting full benefits, or to incur an
actuarial penalty in order to begin collecting benefits at the same age,
reduces the value of those benefits, again permitting the median worker to
capture some of the pension contributions made by others, this time those
made by (relatively) short tenure older workers.
The next line of the table considers an egalitarian model in which the
object of the union is to treat all workers as nearly equally as possible.2
Pensions in this case would be defined benefit pattern plans (or possibly
defined contribution plans with equal dollar per hour contributions per
worker), which would preclude the pensions from further magnifying wage
differentials among workers. A uniform age for normal retirement would
imply pensions of equal value per year of service for all workers
regardless of the age at which they joined the firm.3 Table 1 also
indicates that the egalitarian version of the union voice model would
predict that unions would favor Social Security integration. With
pattern plans, Social Security offsets result in larger pension payments to
lower wage workers, thus tending to equalize total compensation among
those with comparable service. Note that this is contrary to the standard
view of Social Security integration, which treats it as making benefits less
equal, and which is correct for FAP but not pattern plans.
The "intergenerational transfer" theory, based on the ideas of Weiss
(1985), asserts that defined benefit plans may be a means by which those in
-7the union at the timethepension is formed capture at least a part ofthe
monopoly rent that futureunion members wouldotherwise be able to obtain.
Particularly if past service credits (for service before the plan starts)
are involved, the original plan members receive benefits which are largely
financed by futureplanparticipants rather than by themselves, much as
happened with the Social Security system.4 If the object of the plan is to
transfer roughly equal amounts to each original plan member of a given age,
then a pattern plan without Social Security offsets would be appropriate,
as indicated on the seventh line of the table. However, a complete
analysis of this model would require further attention to trade—offs
between median voter and egalitarian motivations analogous to those noted
in the discussion of the elements of the union voice model.
The final theory considered in the table is one discussed by Mincer
(1983).In this theory, the number of workers and hours per worker enter
the production function separately, and firms optimize considering fixed
costs per worker arid variable costs per hour worked.If a union succeeds
in raising the wage rate1 the firm is induced to shift along its production
frontier and employ more workers for a shorter average workweek. In an
effort to counter such an effect, which reduces the union premium received
by each worker1 the union attempts to shift some of compensation to items,
such as paid health insurance, which are fixed costs per worker independent
of hours worked. Pension plans can also serve this purposes but only if
they are pattern plans and do not have Social Security offsets.
The predicted relations in Table 1 dcl not exhaust the explanations for
a union—pension relation, or for the plan characteristics that are
systematically affected by unions. Income taxes are a fundamental part of
any explanation for pensions. Thus the existence of union rents would lead
to the expectation of a positive union coveraqe re1ation and a positive
8relation between unions and pension generosity. Moreover, unionsreduce
the risk to individuals that the firm will renege on the implicit contract.
Therefore, underanumber of the theories examined above, unionsincrease
the attraction of deferred payment schemes and reduce the compensating
differential associated with such plan features as an implied promise to
revise the nominal parameters of pattern plans or to adjust postretirement
5
benefits for cost cf living increases. In addition, our discussion has
ignored the various risks affecting the expected values of pension plans of
different types (Green, 1985), and has ignored issues created by imperfect
capital markets and heterogeneity (Nalebuff and Zeckhauser 1985),
important issues which, in some respects, may have different implications
in union arid nonunion environments. iso ignored are union political
considerations. Union leaders who believe they can fool their membership
may prefer ad hoc over automatic cost of living increases, or pattern over
salary related benefit formulas, creating the impression ofa busyUnion
leadership, while or the membership side, the public good aspects of union
solidarity may limit the extent to which pension benefits will be targeted
on particular groups of union members.
Despite the omissions, the predictions in Table 1 provide a useful
beginning for an analysis of union—nonunion differentials in pension
coverage and plan characteristics.In viewing the empirical results, it
should be borne in mind that a number of the hypotheses are not mutually
exclusive, and that our discussion has not integrated the various theories
to analyze their joint implications. Hence a particular outcome that is
inconsistent with a particular model does nat necessarily mean that the
model is incorrect, but rather that the opposing influences of other models
must be stronger with respect to that outcome.
9III.The Empirical Specification And The Data.
Symbols and definitions for the dependent and explanatory variables
are listed in Table 2.Ltsin those symbols, the probabilities relating
pension and waqe oLtcomes to explanatory variables (X) may be written as
Pr(F, W, 1, M, Rq, F, Ss X)
An individual is considered to be covered by a pension plan if he or she
so indicates, or indicates that he or she will be covered by a pension upon
continued employment for the current employer.6
Not all combinations of the dependent variables are relevant. For
instance, plan characteristics are relevant only if the individual does
have a pension plan. Similarly, age and service requirements for normal
retirement are usually of interest only for defined benefit plans.
Therefore, the estimates break up the probability given above into a
conditional probability chain with three elements, as follows:
Pr(P, W I
Pr(T, M I P=yes, W, X)
Pr(Rq, F, Ss IPyes,W, TDB. P1, Xi
The second probability is estimated only for those with pensions, and the
third only for those with defined benefit pensions.7 In each case, the
estimates are for a general functional form of the relationship between the
probabilities of the dependent variable combinations and the conditioning
var i a b I e s.
The analytical technique used to fit these equations isdiscrete
sultivariate analysis, a technique which is not only ideally suited foranalyzing qualitative data, but has an important advantage in the context
of this study of facilitating the analysis of interaction effects.
Relevant test statistics for significant interactions involving the union
or unionization variables are reported at the bottom of Table 3.In
discrete multivariate analysis, the central statistic is G, which is —2




wherep. is the probability predicted by the model for a combination of
values from the actual data, f. is the corresponding observed frequency,
and i runs over all possible combinations of variables. Estimating an
additional effect (or interaction) will tend to reduce G2, and the
significance of the effect is inferred from the size of the reduction.9
The data set which forms the basis for the empirical analysis is the
1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Detailed information was collected
for the respondent, who was either the head, or in the case of a married
couple, the person who knew the most about family finances, and for the
respondents spouse. These are treated as independent observations. In
addition, for those who indicated that they were covered byapension,
there is a survey of their employers which provides further detail on the
provisions of the pension plan. The employer was not told the name of the
employee. Iccordingly, there is no specific information pertaining to
credited service or to the pension account for the individual. The portion
of the sample analyzed is restricted to private sector employees who were
not self employed.
The 4262familiesin the SCF contain a total of 6998 respondents and
spouses. Of these, 3970 reported their main activity as working. The
11other two major types of activities were being a housewife (1228
individuals) and being retired (1105 individuals). 0-fthosewhose main
activitywas working, 1381 are excluded from the analysis because they
either were self employed or were not private sector employees, and 11
because they did not report union status, leaving 2578 individuals.10




Table 3 presents the central empirical results. The first column
describes the pension characteristics of the population. Thus, 60.17. of
the sample had pensions and 33.1V. did not, with the remainder falling in
the "dont know" category. Column 2 is derived from two sets of
simulations, both using the estimated parameters.1' One set calculates the
distribution of pension characteristics which would result if every
individual in the sample were in a union, holding all other conditioning
variables in that simulation at the values actually observed for
individuals in the sample. The other set calculates the analogous
distribution which would result if no individuals in the sample were in a
union. Hence, the figure in column 2 of row 1 indicates that if everyone
in the sample were in a union, pension coverage would be 25.5 percentage
points higher than it would be if no one in the sample were in a union.
Column 3 indicates the results of a similar exercise comparing the
distributions of characteristics if everyone were in a high unionization
industry relative to the distribution if everyone were in a low
unionization industry. The fourth column compares the distributions if
everyone were in a union and in a high unionization industry versus if
everyone were not jr a union and were in a low unionization industry.
12c:olumn 5 reports on the result; of simulations in which we ask what the
distribution of pension coverage and plan characteristics would be in the
absence of unions.In these sisulations, all individuals are placed in the
nonunion and low unionization cateories.In addition, any conditioning
variables which are themselves outcome variables (such as the wage in the
plan type equation) are adjusted so a; to reflect the indirect effect of
the absence of unions working through such variables.
The empirical results indicate that union membership and workinq in
high unionization industries increase the probability of pension coverage
very substantially.
13
They simultaneously increase the probability of
being in the higher wage cateqories.In comparing the actual percentage of
individuals covered by a pension (60.17.) with the percentage predicted if
there were no unions (52.57.), the bottom line is that, for the population
as a whole, unions and unionization appear to raise pension coverage by
about B percentage points, or fifteen percent above what coverage would
have been in the absence of unions.
Among those covered by pensions, unions and unionization appear to
increase both the probability of belonging to a inultiemployer plan and of
having a plan of the defined benefit variety.14 Among those having defined
benefit plans, unions and higher unionization increase the probability of
age and service (as opposed to age only) requirements for normal retirement
and reduce the probability of having benefits related to salary and of
having Social Security offsets.In almost all cases, that part of the
effect arising from union coverage is somewhat greater than the part
arising from workinq in a high rather than low unionization industry.
In comparing the empirical results of Table 3 with the predictions of
Table 1, predictions from two explanations as to why there are pensions at
13all are contradicted by the data. The simple human capital explanation
predicts that unions should have a negative effect on pension plans
generally and defined benefit plans in particular, both contrary to actual
findings. Also inconsistent with the data is the adverse selection model.
This model makes a fairly strong prediction that unions should increase the
frequency ofaqeonly requirements for normal retirement, but the evidence
strongly suqgests otherwise. Sinceitmakes no definite predictions about
the pension plan characteristics analyzed in this paper, the shirking
hypothesis is not in actual conflict with the data. However, it is
difficult to understand why unions have such strong negative effects on
salary—based formulae and on Social Security offsets in the context of this
hypothesis alone.
Among the explanations relying on union behavior, the median voter
model incorrectly predicts that unions should favor final average pay
plans, while the egalitarianism version errs by predicting that unions
should favor simple age rather than aqe and service requirements for normal
retirement. Both models predict, although weakly, an increase in Social
Security offsets with unions, contrary to the evidence. mong the
remaining explanations, the simple version of the intergenerational
transfer theory, and the story in which unions attempt to use certain types
of pensions to forestall shortened hours, appear to yield the predictions
most in harmony with the estimates. Neither provides a convincing story of
the strong union effects on age and service requirements, however.
Finally, the underfundinq hypothesis is consistent with the observed
relation between unions ard defined benefit pensions, but with no
information on funding, xc are unable to test the theory very stronqly.
(See, however, Ippolito, 198.)
Two interaction terms irvolvinq the results for the union—pension
14coverage relation will be noted. First, there is a reinforcing effect of
union coverage and unionization on pension coverage.In an industry with
low unionization, unioncoverageis associated with a 17.47. higher pension
coverage, while in a high unionization industry it is associated with a
34.97. higher pension coverage. An alternative way of looking at
essentially the same information is that among those covered by a union
contract, those in highly organized industries will have a 19.97. higher
pension coverage rate compared to those in weakly organized industries,
while for nonunion workers the comparable figure is only 1.97. This
reinforcing effect between union coverage and unionization on pension
coverage is reflected in the fact that the combined effect (36.77.) is
substantially higher than the sum of the two separate effects (25.57. +
5.57.).A second important interaction is the negative interaction effect
offirmsize and union coverage on pension coverage. For those in small
firms, union coverage is associated with a 42.77. increase in pension
coverage, while for those in large firms, the increase from union coverage
is 16.47..Analogously, coverage is 35.87.higheramong nonunion workers
employed in large rather than small firms, while union workers in large
firms have a 9.57. higher probability of being covered by a pension than do
union workers in small firms. Either belonging to a large firm or being
covered by a union contract will increase pension coverage substantially
relative to a nonunion member in a small firm, but both characteristics
combined will produce an effect only mildly larger than either one
separately.
V.Conclusions And Implications.
To summarize the empirical results First, in a multivariate setting,
union coverage is found to bear a strong and direct relation to pension
15coverage, and to a set of key plan characteristics. Second, union
strength, as measured by degree of unionization in the industry, also is
found to be systematically related to pension coverage arid to plan
characteristics. Third, significant interactions are found between union
membership and union strength, especially in the pension coverage equation,
sucigesting among other things that the impact of the union strength measure
affects union workers, but does not spill over in its effect on nonunion
workers. Fourth, the relations of pension coverage and plan
characteristics to such variables as firm size or industry are affected
systematically by unions.
Simulations of pension outcomes in the absence of unions imply that
pension coverage in private sector employment in the United States would
fall from 60.17. to 52.57.; the proportion of plans which are defined benefit
would fall from 72.17. to 59.97.; the fraction of defined benefit plans with
age and service requirements for normal retirement would fall from 63.OX to
55.47.; the fraction of defined benefit plans with benefits determined in
accordance with salary would increase from 82.97. to 95.37.; and the fraction
of defined benefit plans with Social Security offsets would increase from
47.97.to52.77..
Amongthe models which, when considered alone, generate predictions
for union—nonunion differences in pension plan characteristics that are in
conflict with the data are a. model which attributes pensions and their
characteristics to fira efforts to reduce turnover and loss of specific
capital, one which postulates that pensions are adopted because they are an
effective device for dealing with adverse selection in a union environment,
the median voter model of the union, and an egalitarian model of the union.
Among the alternative explanations for the union—pension relation, one
16emphasized by Mincer, whereby pensions are used by unions to raise per
worker ascomparedto per hour costs of unionworkers,and a simplified
version of a model which would explain pensions as a device for
transferring rents amonq generations of union members, are consistent with
the largest number of union—nonunion differences in observed plan
characteristics. lso basically not contradicted by the findings, but less
severely tested, is a model which would explain pensions as a device for
protecting quasi—rents on firm investments. The shirking model is not
tested by these data at all.
Results from these empirical exercises do not mean that certain
explanations for pensions can now be entirely ignored. Although an
explanation for pensions may, when considered in isolation, generate
predictions that are inconsistent with the data, the explanation may have
some relevance when combined with others.' number of combinations of
the behavioral models considered above; including some that fore the basis
for more subtle explanations for pensions (e.g., Mincer, 1983 and Freeman,
1985), remain in the running. The job of explicitly integrating and
testing these separate explanations for pensions will be difficult, but is
essential for a full understanding of the labor market effects of pension,
Social Security and retirement policies.
It is obvious from our empirical finding that the effect of unions an
pensions cannot be ignored, and that the expediency of including in a
pension equation a dummy variable for coverage by a union contract, or even
a set of variables reflecting union strength as well, is likely to
reflect inadequately the full influence of the union. The process of
pension determination in the union sector appears to be sufficiently
different from that in the nonunion sector that pension models, and
especially structural explanations, should be tested separately for the
17union and nonunion sectors.
particularly fruitfulareafor further research is the
intergenerational transfer model. That model is both consistent with the
data and provides a vehicle for integrating a number of the explanations for
the union—pension relation which have partial validity. Moreover, the
intergenerational transfer model is extremely interesting from a public
policy viewpoint. For example, if pensions in the union sector are a
device forredistributingunion rents from future to current generations of
union members, then pension losses from plan termination when monopoly rent
disappears, say due to import competition, would be interpreted in a very
different light from pension losses due to abrogation of an implicit
contract on the part of the firms.
18Footnotes
1. Although a final average pay plan would be most advantageous to the
marginal worker in the context of rising real wages, with a flat wage
profile a pattern plan would be equally advantageous, at least if
nominal benefits are frozen at the time of separation. Systematic
information or-i the treatment of benefits for separated but vested
employees is not provided in the SCF, or in other major surveys.
Those pension experts we conferred with felt that most commonly, the
nominal benefit is frozen at separation.
2. Freeman's discussion of the union voice model, as it applies to
pensions, involves a blend of these two models (1985, pp. 105—107).
As noted in the conclusion, the evaluation of these separate elements
of the model need have no implication for the validity of a model in
which they are joined. Freeman does not, however, provide a formal
mechanism for reconciling outcomes when the influences of these two
models conflict.
3. With age and service requirements, a long tenure worker is able to
retire without actuarial penalty at an earlier age than a short tenure
worker, and the fact the long tenure worker will receive benefits for
more years would imply that the total value of his pension benefits
per year of service is greater.
4. If this explanation is true, studies of union—nonunion differences in
compensation which estimate the value of nonwage compensation from
information on the contribution of the firm to pension funds (e.g.,
Rice, 1966, Gustman and Segal, 1972, Solriick, 1978, Freeman, 1981,
1985, and Alpert, 1982) could turn out to be misleading. For a
related discussion and evidence, see Allen and Clark (1986).
Moreover, the desirability of underfunding plans, the question of
ownership of plan assets and the relation of underfunding to stock
prices could all have a very different interpretation from the
conventional one if pensions represent the vehicle for redistributing
union monopoly rents.
5. To illustrate, Allen, Clark and Sumner (1986, p. 132) find, -for the
period 1973 to 1979, that collectively bargained plans had post—
retirement increases that were almost twice a; high as those in plans
that were not collectively bargained.
6. In the sample to be described below, 6.47. of union members and 12.87.
of nonunion members indicated that they were covered by more than one
plan or by a plan with multiple parts.In the case of multiple
coverage, the variable indicating plan type refers to the entire plan.
7. Due to limitations of the computer program calculating the estimates,
the third probability is estimated for two groups of dependent
variables. One group includes the F (formula type) and Ss (an
indicator of Social Security integration) variables, and the other
includes the Rq (plan requirements) variable. This strategy should
not affect any of the estimates reported below because interactions
among these dependent variables are not analyzed in the table, and
because this equation is the last of the probability sequence. A
19variable for the availability of early retirement is also included as
a dependent variable in the second group (along with Rq), but since
almost all firms reported that early retirement was available, the
results involving this variable are not very informative and hence are
not reported in the table.
8. Among the explanatory variables one may question the inclusion of
an age variable; however, the results are similar when the equations
are reestimated without age as a right hand side variable. One may
also argue that industry averages for such variables as education,
race, and sex should be included among the explanatory variables.
While this would increase the computational burden of the discrete
multivariate algorithm considerably, it is relatively easy to test an
analogous proposition, namely, whether the presence or absence of the
unionization variable changes the size of the effects of education,
race, and sex on pension coverage and pension characteristics. When
the analysis for pension coverage and wages is redone, this time
excluding the unionization variable, the size of the effects of these
other variables generally changes by only a small amount.
9. It may be shown that the discrete multivariate algorithm maximizes
exactly the same likelihood function as does the standard multinomial
logit algorithm, and hence the two sets of estimates must be
equivalent (Haberman, 1978). Under the hypothesis of no true,.,effect,
an additional estimated effect will yield a 116' which has a
distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of
aditional independent parameters introduced by the ffect. If the
116isabove the appropriate critical point on the X distribution,
the effect (or interaction) is deemed2to have a significant impact on
the dependent variable. Thus, the 11G statistic tests the joint
significance of a group of dummy variables defining the categories of
an explanatory variable. Whenever higher order interactions are
siqnificant, so are the associated main effects. For previous
examples of the application of this technique to analyze economic
problems, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1981 and 1984).
10.Althoughno explicit screen is applied to eliminate part—time workers
from the sample,' requiring the main activity to be working could be
expected to have a similar effect.
11.Our report to the Department of Labor (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986)
presents a detailed comparison of the descriptive statistics from the
SCF with information from the 1983 CPS as presented in Andrews (1985)
and in Di and Raisian (1985). The matched employer data on plan
provisions are compared with figures from the Labor Department's Level
of Benefits Survey (descriptive statistics are presented in Hatch et
al.1982) and with 1977 data from the Department's EBS—1 file, as
summarized in Kotlikoff arid Smith (1983).In most cases the data
match. When they do not, discrepancies frequently appear to reflect
the different dates of surveys, especially in light of the decline in
unionization between survey dates. Another source of discrepancy is
the difference between surveys in which household members are
included. The SCF includes one adult or a couple from each household.
In contrast, the family unit in the CPS may include a number of
secondary earners. However, there are some discrepancies between the
20SCF data andthose from theE8S—1 file pertaining to union—nonunion
differences inplan characteristicswhich are not readily attributable
to eitherof these causes.
12.Inthe estimates and simulations, all maineectsare left in,
whether significant or not. We also include significant higher order
interactions between the dependent variable(s) and the explanatory
var i ables.
13.For individuals with the characteristics of union workers, Freeman
finds, using CPS data, that union membership increases the probability
of pension coverage by 22%,andfor those with nonuni on
characteristicsby 267. (1985, Table 4.2). Our estimate of the impact
of union coverage on pension coverage of 26% appearsto be consi stent
withthese results, but is only two thirds of the estimated combined
impact of union coverage and unionization.
14.Note that there is some ambiguity in the question that was asked
pertaining to plan entity.Individuals were asked "Does the pension
plan include people who work for other employers than your own?" An
individual who observes former fellow employees who are vested in the
firm's pension plan because of their past employment, but who are
currently working for another firm, may answer yes to this question
even if the plan is not a multiemplayer plan. Kotlikoff and Smith (p.
6) report that 38.67. of union members are in multiemployer plans, and
calculations from their Table 4.1:11 suggest that 37. of nonunion
workers are in multiemployer plans. The comparable figures from the
SCF are 28.6% and 18.27. respectively. With regard to plan type,
Ippolito (1985, Table 4), using a different specification, found that
"unionized participants have a 30 percentage point lower probability
of being covered solely or primarily by adefinedcontribution plan".
(p. 637)
15.Notealso that even though some of the behavioral explanations
examined above may not, by themselves, explain pensions, they may be
relevant for explaining other dimensions of wage and employment policy
which are designed to encourage early exit from the firm.Table 1




CoveraQe Type ments Formula Integration
Explanations for
Pro vi s i on s:
Human Capital DC
Shirking
Adverse Selection + OS Aqe
Only
Pension Underfunding + OS
Union: Median Voter + DB Age and FAR +
Service
Union: Egalitarianism + DB Age pattern +
OnI y
Union;Intergener— + DB pattern
ational Transfers
Union: Opposition to + DB pattern
Shortened Hours
—LTable 2: Variable Definitions*
Symbol Definition
Dependent Variables:
F Type of formula: final average pay (FAP) or pattern
M Single or multiemployer plan
P Coverage by a persian plan, as reported by the individual
Rq Requirements for normal retirement: age requirements only, age
and service requirements, or service requirements only
Ss Whether or not the plan has a Social Security offset
I Plan type: defined benefit, defined contribution, or both
W A categorical wage variable with limits defined to divide the
sample into quarters, as follows:Wi < $4.60,
$4.60 < W2 < $7.78, $7.78 ( W3 < $12.69, and $12.69 < W4
Explanatory Variables:
A Age: five categories are defined as: Al < 25, 25 ￿A2< 35
￿ AS< 45, 45A4 < 55 55 ,AS)
Ed Level of education——college graduate, some college, high school
graduate, and less than high school
Mf Manufacturing: whether or not the individuals industry is in
manufacturing
Dc A set of three categorical variables indicating whether the
occupation is blue collar, white collar managerial or other
white collar
Ra Race: white or nonwhite
Sx Sex: male or female
Sz Firm size: whether or not the firm has 100 or more employees
Un Coverage by a union contract on the job or not
Uz A variable based on data developed by Freeman and Medoff (1979)
classifying the three digit industry of employment according to
degree of unionization. The categories, which divide the
sample into thirds are: Uzi < 77., 77. < Uz2 < 317., and
317. ￿Uz3
*Inaddition, there is a separate NA category defined for all variables
except F, Rq, Ss, and I, which are reported by the firm, and Un and Sx.
23Table 3
Partial Relation Of Union Membership And Unionization
To Probabilities Of Pension Outcomes: Estimated From Firm Responses
FractionUnion Unioniz— All Simulated
Of Contract ation Unions Fraction
Population (Yes (High— —No With No
In -No) Low) Unions Unions
Category
Pension Coverage and Wage
Pension Coverage (Self Reported)
Covered .601 .255 .055 .367 .525
In Large Firms .164
In Small Firms .427
Not Covered .331 —.234 —.034 —.307 .388
InLarge Firms —.139
In Small Firms -.411
Wage (Self Reported)
Low .223 —.136 .009 —.135 .239
Medium Low .223 -.014 —.081 -.101 .273
Medium High .222 .091 .075 .185 .163
High .223 .025 .038 .029 .233
Plan Characteristics for Those with Pensions
Plan Entity (Self Reported)
Multiemployer Plan .192 .116 .037 .144 .154
Single Employer Plan .682 -.085 —.040 —.109 .698
Plan Type (Firm Data)
Defined Benefit .721 .150 .098 .239 .599
Defined Contribution .147 —.127 —.005 —.130 .206
Both .132 —.022 —.093 —.109 .194
Plan Characteristics for Those with Defined Benefit Plans
Age and Service Requirements .630 .149 .112 .302 .554
(Firm Data)
Benefits Related to Salary —.200 —.045 —.192 .953
(Firm Data)
Social Security Offset .479 -.339 .008 —.284 .527
(Firm Data)
'ATable 3 (continued}
Interactions With Union Membership And
Unioni:ation Siqnificant at the 95 Level
Interaction d.f. Interaction86L f
Sz Un P 10.60 4 Mf Un T 14.61 4
Dc Uz P 29.87 14 Uz M1 21.53 12
Un Uz P 15.57 6 Hf Uz Rq 12.41 1
Dc Uz W 54.61 28 Un Uz Rq 13.60 3
Hf 112W 20.75 4 Un FlRq 4.62 2
Un SxW 19.80 4 Un H F 14.90 2
Hf Uz Fl 15.75 2 Hf Uz Ss 26.33 1
Un lizM 19.52 6 liz A Ss 24.78 12
Un Ed H 14.62 6
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